Is public co-ordination of investment in information security desirable? by Ioannidis, Christos et al.
Journal of Information Security, 2016, 7, 60-80 
Published Online March 2016 in SciRes. http://www.scirp.org/journal/jis 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jis.2016.72005   
How to cite this paper: Ioannidis, C., Pym, D. and Williams, J. (2016) Is Public Co-Ordination of Investment in Information 
Security Desirable? Journal of Information Security, 7, 60-80. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jis.2016.72005   
 
 
Is Public Co-Ordination of Investment in  
Information Security Desirable? 
Christos Ioannidis1, David Pym2, Julian Williams3 
1Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath, UK 
2Department of Computer Science, University College London, London, UK 
3Durham University Business School, Durham, UK 
 
 
Received 21 March 2016; accepted 27 March 2016; published 30 March 2016 
 
Copyright © 2016 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides for the presentation, in an integrated manner, of a sequence of results ad-
dressing the consequences of the presence of an information steward in an ecosystem under at-
tack and establishes the appropriate defensive investment responses, thus allowing for a cohesive 
understanding of the nature of the information steward in a variety of attack contexts. We deter-
mine the level of investment in information security and attacking intensity when agents react in a 
non-coordinated manner and compare them to the case of the system’s coordinated response un-
dertaken under the guidance of a steward. We show that only in the most well-designed institu-
tional set-up the presence of the well-informed steward provides for an increase of the system’s 
resilience to attacks. In the case in which both the information available to the steward and its 
policy instruments are curtailed, coordinated policy responses yield no additional benefits to in-
dividual agents and in some case they actually compared unfavourably to atomistic responses. The 
system’s sustainability does improve in the presence of a steward, which deters attackers and re-
duces the numbers and intensity of attacks. In most cases, the resulting investment expenditure 
undertaken by the agents in the ecosystem exceeds its Pareto efficient magnitude. 
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1. Information Stewardship 
Information produces value for an organization or individual when it improves the solutions to decision-making 
problems whose outcomes have consequences for their welfare. The information system refers to the entire 
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collection of data sources and related service capabilities both internal and external to the organization that 
decision makers are required to use. The system is user-centred because it serves the objectives of the organi- 
zation by providing the information needed to achieve its mission. 
The security of such systems is of paramount importance and economic agents are willing to allocate scarce 
resources in protecting the system when it is threatened. Information systems based almost exclusively on digital 
technologies are subject to and degraded by cyberattacks, which are initiated and executed remotely. As the 
subjects of such attacks have no clear means of identifying the initiators and stopping their activities, their main 
concern is to preserve the system’s functionality in all its dimensions by allocating resources, thus incurring cost, 
to maintain it at the level of operational capacity required by the organization. More specifically, information 
security, is conventionally defined as protecting the system’s confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the decisions about expenditure/investment in information 
security should be socially coordinated via a steward or such decisions are better left to individual organizations. 
The subsequent discussion and models follow closely [1]-[4], where the proofs elided here may be found. This 
paper’s contribution lies in the integration of a dispersed body of work addressing the issues regarding the co- 
ordination of investment in information security. Whilst the problems of sustainability and resilience have been 
addressed separately, combining them in a single theoretical framework provides for a clear appreciation of the 
policy issues emerging from public co-ordination. Related organizational issues have been examined by [5]. 
There is no generally accepted scientific definition of the concept of stewardship. In more general terms, 
stewardship is an ethic guiding the allocation and management of some of the participants’ resources in an 
ecosystem (household, common interest community, commercial firm, etc.) in order to sustain and protect the 
ecosystem, rather than the welfare maximization of individual agents, in the presence of anticipated and 
unanticipated shocks. The steward will be part of the ecosystem itself and can emerge either from internal or 
external forces. 
The concept of stewardship in environmental economics is an established tool for environmental and natural 
resource management; see [6] and mitigation risk for climate change [7]. In the context of information security, 
we define the role of the steward as the institution that maintains the sustainability and resilience of the 
ecosystem’s operational capacity—that is, its levels of confidentiality, integrity, and availability—which may be 
threatened by attacks. By resilience (cf. [8]), we mean the system’s internal capacity to restore itself to an 
acceptable operating state following a disturbance to its status; by sustainability, we mean the tendency of the 
system to maintain itself within acceptable bounds of operating state despite possibly hidden dynamics that may 
tend to guide the system outwith these bounds. 
Stewards might emerge as a consequence of the behaviour of agents interacting in a system of exchange 
which is in turn conditioned by their preferences, the established legal framework, and existing social conven-
tions. Such conventions, known as norms, are either descriptive—that is, what actions the agents in the system 
take—or prescriptive, influencing what behaviour ought to be. The legal framework expresses system’s values 
and determines the consequences (punishment) for actions deviating from such values. [9] argued that agents 
derive benefits from the supply of the public good—in this context, sustainability and resilience for the ecosys-
tem—and, more importantly, that they have an intrinsic motivation to undertake costly effort to the production 
of the public good. 
Part of the role of the steward is to alter what constitutes normal behaviour. Agents in a decentralized ecosys- 
tem may have beliefs, based on incomplete information, regarding the contributions of the others and thus are in 
danger in holding erroneous perceptions of the true societal norm. The steward, by dispelling such miss-percep- 
tions, can attain substantial benefits for the system as participants modify their behaviour under its guidance. For 
example, when agents are excessively optimistic regarding the conduct of others, the result is a fall in com-
pliance. In this context, the steward of the ecosystem, which is subject to shocks and in secular decline, to pro-
tect the system will exercise the option available to him, prescriptive intervention. Such interventions range from 
widely publicized public campaigns to enforceable standards, and which boost social pressure on the individual 
agents to comply and make punishable the failure by agents to meet these standards. The underlying assumption 
here is that the steward is globally-informed compared to individuals about the currently prevailing community 
standards. In a more general setting, the steward knows the underlying distribution of preferences/risk aversion/ 
discount rates in society, information which is difficult and costly for a single agent to collect and process. The 
importance of the legal framework in delivering binding agreement to the production of the public good has 
been studied by [10] [11], and others. Such studies show that compliance is raised when its level has been cho-
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sen through a voting decision by the participants of the community/ecosystem. To maximize the effectiveness of 
its actions, the law-maker/principal/steward, in setting the regulatory framework and other obligations/incentives, 
must take into account the impact of its actions on the formulation of the norms which will be now expected to 
prevail. To illustrate the point in the context of investment in cybersecurity we may consider a steward signal-
ling to its community the need for very high levels of IT defence expenditure. Such request is actually convey-
ing the signal that the current situation is very dangerous and in this case this might deter well meaning agents as 
they perceive themselves as spending too much compared to their community. It is important that the steward 
allows a framework where the behaviour of the individual is observed by others to ensure compliance to the 
chosen standard. 
The exercise of stewardship is costly to the ecosystem participants and to agents assuming this role as it re-
quires investment of resources in infrastructure, the creation of a legal framework and monitoring required to 
deliver its mission. The motives for agents to engage in such activities are diverse, and they range from individ-
ual welfare maximization to a form of altruistic behaviour. Simple profit maximization can be seen as the mo-
tive of a retailer, who voluntarily assumes the role of the steward, in the case where multiple sellers are using its 
platform to connect with consumers. In this case the retailer acting as the steward safeguards that contracts ne-
gotiated between the sellers and the consumers on its platform are honoured and the ecosystem maintains its 
credibility as a space of secure commercial transactions. 
Profit maximization is by no means the only motive for engaging in stewardship. Recent studies from psy-
chology and economics provide strong empirical evident for the existence of pro-social behaviour. For a recent 
survey, see [9] [12] [13]. That is, agents engage frequently in costly activities whose benefits accrue to others. In 
a highly decentralized ecosystem, some agents will possess the intrinsic motivation to behave pro-socially. Such 
agents will typically have two motivations. First, they will care for the overall provision of the public good to 
which their individual actions contribute, but also they will care for the consumption of this good by others. 
We begin this paper by developing separate models, to elucidate in some detail the concepts of resilience and 
sustainability in terms of investment in information security with and without the information steward. Both 
models presented in Sections 2 and 3 (following [1]-[4]) are based on strategic interactions between the agents 
of the eco-system who wish to protect their information resources and attackers who derive benefits from de-
grading the system’s operational capacity. Both attackers and defenders are incurring costs whilst engaging in 
their respective activities and the extent of their involvement in defending and attacking is determined by the 
existing technologies, time preferences and the value of the information assets. 
The two graphs below depict the concepts in terms of the time evolution of the system’s operational capacity 
in the presence, first, of secular deterioration, and, second, unanticipated performance reducing shocks. The dy- 
namics of resilience are depicted in Figure 1. In this graph, we depict the system’s predictable time path within 
the acceptable tolerances in performance denoted by its nominal operational capacity. Along this path, at time 
1t  the system experiences an unanticipated shock of moderate magnitude that degrades its capacity, placing it 
outside the acceptable range and guides the system to lower capacity levels. In the absence of the steward, such 
a shock may prove permanently detrimental to the state of the system, with the system’s path depicted by the 
broken line. The actions of the steward render the system resilient as they are able to reverse the divergent path 
and restore the system to its “trend” capacity (solid line), up to the planning horizon, T. Alternatively, in the 
presence of a substantial shock, as the one depicted at time 2t , the best the steward can achieve is to halt the 
system’s rapid deterioration and stabilize the system’s operational capacity to a steady, albeit lower, level. 
The dynamics of sustainability are depicted in Figure 2. In this graph, we characterize the system’s equili- 
brium course over time. We envisage that the system degrades steadily and predictably along this path. Its 
internal dynamic structure without the steward will result in the system’s inability to perform within the accept- 
able bounds by 1t . The steward’s contribution to the system’s sustainability is to delay the rate of degradation 
beyond the planning horizon T. Again, the steward adopts the relevant policies and installs the required 
institutional framework at 0t . Therefore, the steward permanently changes the long-term dynamic structure of 
the system at the beginning, permitting the system to enjoy a considerable extension to its useful life compared 
to the state where the steward is absent. 
By adopting such actions/policies, the steward extends the life of the system, minimizes the impact of the 
shocks, enhancing the system’s predictability and robustness of performance. The benefits of the existence of 
such institutional arrangement accrue to all the participants of the ecosystem, reducing the incentive for existing 
members to abandon and encouraging new agents to join. Figure 3 nests the previous notions of stewardship  
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Figure 1. Resilience.                                                                                  
 
 
Figure 2. Sustainability.                                                                                 
 
into a multi-period representation of system sustainability. 
There are prominent examples of the exercise of information stewardship in EU, UK, and US legislation. For 
example, consider the contribution of the existence of the Freedom of Information Acts in the UK and US on 
policy decision-making. In their absence, information provided by the public will be limited by the public’s per- 
ception of misuse, so restricting the information available to policy-makers. For another example, the US’s 
response to EU privacy legislation in constituting “Safe Harbor” (http://export.gov/safeharbor/, access 4 March 
2013) encouraged and maintained trade between the two economics. Both cases are examples of sustainability 
as the steward intervenes to maintain the market. 
The failure of stewardship to maintain resilience is demonstrated by the failure in June 2012 of the Royal 
Bank of Scotland’s payment processing systems, which support an ecosystem subsidiary banks. A software 
upgrade corrupted the system and, in the absence of sufficient system management resources, the ecosystem’s 
payment processing systems ceased to function for a considerable period of time and, for several banks, 
acceptable service levels were stored only after considerable delay. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a summary of mathematical results on  
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Figure 3. Nesting one period sustainability into a multi-period framework.                                         
 
the notion of sustainability, and the proofs for this section may be found in [2]; Section 3 provides a summary of 
a mathematical model of resilience in a simple security setting, and the proofs for this section may be found in 
[4]; finally, Section 4 provides a brief summary of the implications for stewardship in this setting. 
2. A Model of Sustainability 
We begin with a condensed outline of the model presented in [1]-[4]. 
We assume that the steward is able to pass on the cost of his decisions to the agents in the ecosystem whilst 
improving the agents’ security. In this set-up, individual agents are assumed face a known probability of 
successful attack and they possess known mitigation technologies. In both cases, to demonstrate the role of a 
steward in enhancing the ecosystem’s sustainability and resilience, we set up a model of strategic interactions 
between targets (typically firms, but possibly individuals) and attackers (typically individuals, but possibly 
organized groups). Attackers are assumed to be profit-maximizing and risk-neutral.1 We introduce the concept 
of a steward who co-ordinates the defensive expenditure of the targets. We show that as the steward, as in 
Figure 2, seeks to sustain the life of the ecosystem to at least the planning horizon is setting mandatory levels of 
defensive expenditure for each target. These are set using time preferences for the valuation of expected future 
losses from successful attacks over the period of his planning horizon. 
We begin by evaluating the role of the steward in contributing to the system’s sustainability. We assume that 
the steward is a Stackelberg policy-maker, who imposes a policy as a first move irrespective of the reactions of 
the participants in the ecosystem. In addition, we assume that increasing defensive expenditure by an ecosystem 
participant reduces the likelihood of successful attacks on that participant and that for any given participant, the 
greater the number of attackers, the higher the likelihood of a successful attack. 
Building on the seminal contribution to benefit-cost analysis for information security investments presented 
by Gordon and Loeb (GL) [14], we present a framework for managing security investments in information eco- 
systems [5] in which we identify the role of the steward in regulating the allocation of resources by the eco- 
system’s participants. 
Targets of security attacks are GL expected-loss-minimizers and Attackers act as rational agents. They are 
assumed to have utility functions, with well-defined preferences. All attack and investment decisions are taken 
 
 
1It is straightforward to vary the model to account for payoffs that are utility-maximizing, but not necessarily monetary; for example, as in 
terrorism. 
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discounting under a risk-neutral measure. That is, the combination of time preferences (captured by discount 
factors, β ), probability measures, Ψ , and measured losses, L, admits any standard representation (e.g., 
constant relative or constant absolute) of risk-aversion. The possible difference between the discount factors, β , 
adopted by targets and the steward will be of importance in evaluating the stewards’s contribution to the 
system’s sustainability. 
Consider an ecosystem with TN  targets and a fixed number AN  of attackers. We set the ratio 
A
T
N
N
η = ; 
that is, the number of attackers per target. 
Decisions on security investment are taken at time zero and are assumed to be made with full commitment. 
The usefulness of time in this context is not to add temporal dynamics to the security investment problem, but to 
illustrate the impact of different discount rates between participants in the game. 
Let ( ), ,i tη αΨ  be the instantaneous probability that a single attack will be successful in the absence of any 
defensive expenditure. We will assume that attacks have independent probabilities and a functional form that 
satisfies the condition that eventually an attacker will be successful is 
( ), , 1 e ,i ti t α ηη α −Ψ = −  
where iα  is a technology parameter, the security decay factor, that relates the probability of successful attack 
to the number of attackers per target and t is continuous time in the interval 0 <t t T≤ . 
The expected loss at t, in the absence of security investment, is given by ( ) ( ), , 1 e i ti i iL t L α ηη α −Ψ ≡ − , where 
iL  is the current or nominal monetary loss from an attack and is fixed over 0 <t t T≤ . We assume the current 
value of assets is evenly (by time discounted weighting) amortized over T. 
The present value of losses, in the absence of security investment, given a discount rate iβ , for the 
thi  target 
is 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
0
0
e e 1 e
e 1 e d .
i i i i
i i
T
t t tT i i it t
i
i i it
t
L
L t
α η β α η α η
β α η
β α η
β αη β
− +
− −
 − +
 − = − +
  
∫  
Let ( )= , , e xii t ψη α −Ψ Ψ . Ψ  is the instantaneous probability of realizing a loss iL  and the expected value 
of losses over the time period 0 ,t T    is given by 
0
e d .
T t
it
L tβ− Ψ∫   
That is, integrating losses multiplied by their probabilities and discounted at rate β . 
2.1. Target Security Investment 
As targets are aware of the threats to their information assets each target has a control instrument, denoted ix , 
the level of defensive expenditure and, for simplicity of exposition, we also assume that this is set at 0t  with 
commitment. 
We further assume that defensive expenditure reduces the probability of a successful attack by a continuous 
rate, iψ , which is another technology parameter, the security effectiveness factor. The interpretation of iψ  is 
that it is the amount of investment needed to reduce the probability of attack by 1 e , following the Gordon and 
Loeb rule [14]. 
Therefore, in the presence of defensive expenditure the instantaneous expected loss from attacks, in the  
presence of defensive expenditure at time t, is now ( )1 e ei i it xiL α η ψ− −− . Setting 0iψ = , makes instantaneous  
expected losses constant and independent of defensive expenditure ix . That is, targets are incapable, for all t, of 
mitigating the risk of loss. 
The term ψ  relates the effectiveness of defensive expenditure in mitigating the probability of a successful 
attack in all periods.Taking into account the investment in information security the expected present value of 
losses for each target is therefore 
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( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
0
0
e 1 e e d
e 1 e e
.
i i i i
i ii i
T
t t x
i
t
T
t xt t
i i
i i i
t
PV L t
L
β α η ψ
α η β ψα η α ηβ α η
β αη β
− − −
− − −
= −
 − +
 = − +
  
∫
 
As targets are risk neutral (relative to their discount rate), the net present value (adding the t0 expenditure of 
0x− ) of losses is equivalent to their utility at t0. Therefore, 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
0
e 1 e e
.
i ii i
T
t xt t
i i i
i i i i
i i i
t
L
U x L x x
α η β ψα η α ηβ α η
β αη β
− − − − +
 = − = − − +
  
  
In the presence of an exogenous η , the thi  target minimizes losses with respect to ix : 
( )( ) ( )
( )
*
e 1 e e
= .argmin
T xT T i ii i
i i i
i i
x i i ii
L
x x
α η β ψα η α ηβ α η
β αη β
− − −
− +
+
+
 
Differentiating the net present value of losses with respect to xi and setting the derivative equal to zero yields 
( )e e
= 1.
T x T xi i i i i i i
i i i i
i i i
L Lα η β ψ β ψψ ψ
αη β β
− + − − −
− +
+
 
Therefore, for a given η , *x  has the following analytic solution: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1* 1 1, , , , , log e e .i ii TTi i i i i i i i i i i i ix L T L L β α ηβη α β ψ ψ β ψ αη β ψ− − +−− −= − +  
Thus improvements in protective technology (increasing iψ s) lead to diminishing optimal marginal security 
returns on expenditure and, as the efficiency of attackers increases (increasing iα s), optimal defensive expendi- 
ture increases slightly more than proportionately. 
For any given monetary loss, iL , time horizon, T, and technology parameters, iψ  and iα , increases in the 
discount rate, iβ , lead to lower defensive expenditures as the valuation of future losses declines faster. 
Attackers are non-cooperative and risk neutral and make rational choices to participate in attacks. The reward 
for individual attacker successfully attacking agent I is denoted iR . We further assume that attacking effort 
requires a costly one-off investment at 0t , denoted by AC , and that future gains from attacks are discounted at 
a rate γ . We suppose that attackers randomly choose targets according to a uniform distribution and as such  
can only identify average defensive expenditure x  where 1
TN
iix x== ∑ . The expected reward a time t from 
successful attacks is given by 
( ) ( )1
1
1 e e ,
T
i
N
xt
A i
i
V t N R ψα −− −
=
= −∑    
and its present value by 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
0
0
e e e
, .
T
t t xT
A
t
R
PV t T
α γ α γ ψαγ α α γ
γη α γ
+ − + − + − +
 =  +
  
  


 

 
The marginal attacker enters the market until the present value of expected rewards, ( )APV T , equals the value 
of costs AC . In this case of a single decision to attack, with first winner takes all attackers and random target 
selection the attacker decision reduces to the expectation of being the successful attacker from η  attackers. 
The boundary condition for the marginal attacker choosing to enter the market for attacks requires the equality 
of the present value of an attack APV  to its cost of launching it: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
e e e
.
T T xT
A
R
C
α γ α γ ψαγ α α γ
γη α γ
+ − + −+ − +
=
+
  


 

 
Dividing both sides of this equation by R, setting Ac C R=   to be the expected cost per reward, and solving for 
η , the equilibrium level of attacks per target is 
( )( ) ( )
( )
*
e e e e
.
T T xT T
c
α γ α γ ψα αγ α γ α
η
γ α γ
+ − + −+ − −
=
+
  
 
 

 
The following proposition, proved in [1] [2], establishes the level of optimal expenditure in information security 
by each target and the attack intensity (attacks per target): 
Proposition 1. For TN  ex-ante identical targets choosing defensive expenditure level x  and for AN  
first-winner-takes-all attackers, where A TN Nη =  is endogenous, the Nash equilibrium levels of expenditure 
Nx  and the number of attackers per target Nη  are given by the solutions to the following pair of equations: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )11 e e e e NT T xN T Tc α γ α γ ψα αη γ α γ γ α γ α− + − + −−= + + − −  
( ) ( )11 1log e e .
NTN T Nx L L
β αηβψ β ψ αη β ψ
− − +− − − = − + 
 
 
When the target responses are coordinated by a fully informed information steward whose sole objective is to 
improve the ecosystem’s sustainability and can impose his choice of defensive expenditure, Pix , on each indi- 
vidual target, i, in calculating the optimal investment in cyber-defence takes into account its impact on the 
actions of attackers. 
The steward minimizes his objective function, where the Pix  denote the investments required by the steward 
for targets i: 
( )
0=1
1 =1 =1
arg min e 1 e e d ,
PT TT ii i i
Nt
i i
TN NN tt xP
i i ii i ix t
x L t x
α ηδ ψ−− −
=
  
   = − +    
∑ ∑∫
x
 
where 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )11 e e e e .T T xP T Tc α γ α γ ψα αη γ α γ γ α γ α− + − + −−= + + − −x        
In this formulation, the rational steward anticipates the impact of its impact on the market for attacks as it sets 
P
ix , rather than in the case of individual firms, where 
P
ix  is exogenous and set in equilibrium. 
As mentioned above the possible differences between the discount rates of the steward and the individual 
agents are important factors in determining the optimal level of investment in information security. In the first 
instance, we evaluate the case where iβ β=  and δ β=  which permits an exact identification of the Pareto 
optimal allocation of defensive expenditure and illustrates the total reduction in the present value of expected 
losses gained from achieving the Pareto optimal allocation versus the Nash equilibrium. Subsequently we 
examine the case where the steward sets a specific discount rate δ β< . In this instance the steward values 
future security outcomes more highly than an individual firm. 
With TN  ex-ante identical targets this reduces the policy-maker’s problem to a representative one dimen- 
sional optimization problem. In this case, the attackers identify P Pix x= , α , ψ , and c precisely (as targets 
are identical). Their problem does not change substantially, however, and the optimal attacker per target is 
defined in equilibrium as 
( )( ) ( )
( )
e e e e
.
PT T xT T
P
c
α γ α γ ψα αγ α γ α
η
γ α γ
+ − + −+ − −
=
+
 
The policy-maker takes fully into account the attacker intensity into their optimization problem. The algebraic 
expression is more complex, but the derivative with respect to xP is analytic. The loss per target P P TL TL N=  
over the time horizon 0,T  is evaluated as 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
e e e e
1 e
e .
e e e
T x T T xTT c
TP
T x T T
L L x
c
α γ ψ α γ α γ ψαα γ γ α α γ δ α γ
α γ
α γ
α γ ψ α γ α
α γ
δ α γ α γ γ α α γ
− + − + + +  + − + + +    −
+
+
+ + +
 
 
− 
  
 = + +
+ − − + − + +
 
This is the discounted present value using the policy-maker’s discount rate and in the first instance δ β= . 
Differentiating with respect to x yields the optimal level of investment for each firm under the guidance of the 
steward. 
Proposition 2. For a steward setting mandatory defensive expenditure xP for NT ex-ante identical targets with 
discount rate δ  on future expected losses, xP is the solution for x of the following equation: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )e e e e
2 2
2
e e e
1 e
e
e e e
e ( )e
e
e e
T T xT T
T T xT
T c
T x
T T xT
T T
c T
T x
T x T
L
c
c LT
c
α γ α γ ψα γ ψ α
α γ α γ ψα
α γ γ α α γ δ α γ
α γ
α γ ψ
α γ α γ ψα
α γ α
α γ γ α α γ
δ ψ
α γ
α γ ψ α γ
δ ψ α γ
α γ γ α α γ δ α γ
α γ ψ γ α α γ
δ α γ α γ γ α
+ + +− + −
+ − + −
+ − + + +
−
+
+ +
+ + +
+
+ − +
− − −
+
+ + +
 
 
− 
 
 +
− + − + + − +
+ − + − + +
+ − − + − ( )( )
1.
e Tαα γ
=
+ +
 
Although this equation is not analytically solvable for Px , it is computable once the policy-maker and 
attackers’ discount rates δ , γ  are chosen along with the nominal loss L. The remaining terms are the tech- 
nology parameters L  and ψ  and are subject to uncertainty. 
We now set up the following simulations: the discount rate of the attackers 15%γ = , the discount rate for 
both the steward and the targets 25%δ β= = ; the ranges of the technology parameters are given as 
{ }0.1,0.25,0.5ψ =  (defence is not effective to very effective), { }0,2α ∈  (attacking effort is not effective to 
very effective), and L (≈$500,000): on the basis of these we compute Nx  versus PX  over the range of α . 
We then use these values of Nx  and PX  to compute the nominal loss factor 
( ) ( )0, 1 e e d
T t xR x tαη ψη − −= −∫  
and the discounted expected total loss 
( )0 e 1 e e d ,
T t t xTL L t xδ αη ψ− − −= − +∫  
for comparison purposes. The results are depicted in Figure 4. 
We now consider the case where δ β<  (see Figure 5); that is, the policy-maker has longer term time 
preferences than the ex-ante identical targets. It is here that the steward deviates from standard notions of a 
benevolent public policy-maker and this relates explicitly to the sustainability concept outlined above. 
The steward’s time preferences indicate longer horizon planning than the individual participants, by setting 
( ) 1log 1T λ δ −= − − , for a value of λ  close to one. 
Using the previous case parameter values as a starting point we solve for Px  versus Sx  whilst varying 
{ }0,2α ∈  and for { }0.1,0.25,0.5ψ = , for a group of TN  ex-ante identical targets. 
The results are as expected: for all configurations of α  and ψ  considered, the level of defensive expendi- 
ture is higher. The nominal loss factor ( ),R x η , the truly fair comparison between the Pareto steward versus the 
long term steward, indicates that total nominal expected loss per pound from attacking effort drops substantially 
as the steward sets a longer term strategy. 
The ex-ante identical individual firms now no longer view the imposed Sx  as Pareto optimal and losses 
included and balanced off by the steward are not viewed in the same way by the individual firm. Therefore, for  
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Figure 4. Comparison of the impact of a steward on defensive expenditure, risk, and expected losses assuming that the 
ecosystem consists of UK SMEs of the type surveyed in Case 2. For tractability, we assume identical targets. The level of 
defensive expenditure for each target is denoted by x (the left plot), the expected loss factor ( ) ( )0, 1 e e d
T t xR x tαη ψη − −= −∫  
(centre plot) and total expected losses ( )0 e 1 e e d
T t t xTL L t xδ αη ψ− − −= − +∫  (the right plot). The dashed lines are the values of 
defensive expenditure, loss factor, and total expected losses over a varying security decay factor α  (the abscissa values) in 
the absence of the steward. The red line presents the scenario when the security effectiveness factor ψ  is equal to 0.1 (low 
effectiveness), the blue and green lines present the cases for 0.25ψ =  (intermediate effectiveness) and 0.5ψ =  (high 
effectiveness). The unbroken lines represent the same cases, ceteris paribus; however, there is now a steward coordinating 
defensive expenditure. The time preferences of the agents are as follows: we assume identical targets each with a discount 
rate of 0.25β = , a steward with discount rate 0.25δ β= =  and attackers with a discount rate of 0.15γ = . The value of 
information security assets at risk at time t is assumed to be 
0
e dT t L tβ− =∫  $2 Million to £555,555 ≈ $500,000 and TL is 
presented per $1000 of assets. Attacker rewards are set such that they receive 0.15 units of revenue per unit of effort 
therefore 0.85c = .                                                                                            
 
all values of α  and ψ , the long-term steward is deemed to be more expensive in present value terms. In all 
cases, the size of this effect diminishes with decreasing α  (reduced attacker efficacy) and increasing ψ  (in- 
creasing defensive effectiveness). There is an externality created by the attacker-choice η  which interacts with 
the new choice of δ . The steward views the externality as being larger compared to its evaluation by individual 
targets (as the attacker-choice of η  lasts for the whole time horizon 0 < <t t T , the action of reducing δ  
necessarily increases T and subsequently the valuation of the externality. 
Unambiguously, if the steward has a lower discount rate than the individual target firms, then the value of the 
costly action deemed necessary to negate the externality will be higher than that required by the targets to attain 
the Pareto optimal allocation subject to their time preferences. 
A more attractive way of thinking about discount rates is to derive the time horizon over which the majority 
of their value amortizes towards zero. The firm-specific discount rates are set to amortize the firm’s current 
investment assets over a time period consistent with the lifespan of previous information security assets. This 
provides a baseline for the steward’s time horizon in terms of managing externalities. Should the steward desire 
the externalities to be managed over a longer, more sustainable, time horizon, then the adopted discount rate will 
be set lower than the representative rate determined by the individual firms. Larger scale ecosystems, such as the 
internet, are usually assumed to require longer term planning. Hence, stewards in this context might amortize 
expected losses from risks to the system over much longer periods. Therefore the incremental investment in  
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Figure 5. We compare the allocation of optimal investment Px  versus Sx , for the cases in which δ β=  and δ β< , 
respectively. The left hand plot presents the optimal allocation of defensive expenditure when 0.25δ =  (dashed line) 
versus 0.15δ =  (unbroken line) for varying security effectiveness ψ  (red 0.1ψ = , blue 0.25ψ =  and green 0.5ψ = ) 
against the security decay factor (the abscissa values) α  varying from 0 (no decay) to 2 (attackers erode security very 
quickly). The centre plot presents the loss factor ( ),R x η  and the right hand plot the total expected losses to targets 
assuming their own discount rate 0.25β = . Attackers have a discount rate of 0.15γ = . Information security assets at risk 
at time t is assume to be 
0
e dT t L tβ− =∫  $2 Million ≈ 500,000 and TL is presented per $1000 of assets. Attacker rewards are set 
such that they receive 0.15 units of revenue per unit of effort; therefore, 0.85c = .                                     
 
information security that are imposed on individual participants in the ecosystem are deemed to be unnecessarily 
burdensome given their own time preferences. 
If δ β=  (see Figure 5), the resulting universal increase in defensive expenditure may not be sufficient to 
meet the sustainability target. In this case, the steward sets a discount rate less than β  in order to achieve the 
sustainability target within the predefined time period. Such divergence of discount rates between the individual 
and the social is common in finance and environmental economics. An example of the debate on choice and 
imposition of social discount rates is in the climate change literature [15], where the choice of discount rate is 
particularly acute as the forward horizons are over multiple decades and centuries and, in this context, exponen- 
tial discounting reduces future losses toward zero after a finite number of years. In the information security 
context, the impact of the time preference assumption is not so acute as investment horizons are much shorter 
(see for instance [16] for a model of investment horizons). However, the interaction of the externality with the 
differentiated discount rates between targets and the steward does indicate that this is an important issue for 
information ecosystems. 
3. A Model of Resilience 
A key feature of our account of resilience is that we illustrate how thresholds for the effectiveness of stewards 
emerge from the underlying model of the response of information ecosystems to the hostility of the environ- 
ment.2 
Again, we consider a set of NT ex-ante identical targets choosing to allocate defensive resources that mitigate 
the harm from attacks. However, in this case, the targets need to solve, simultaneously, a multi-dimensional 
 
 
2Note by that the hostility of the environment we mean a representation of the capacity of attackers rather than simply the success or failure 
of an individual attack. 
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resource-allocation problem. Let the subscripts h and l represent to potential areas of allocation of assets, where 
h and l denote the areas of high and low security at which information assets are held, and let 0hx ≥  and 
0lx ≥  denote the one-off investments made at time t0 in securing assets located in the corresponding areas. 
Finally, we define z to be a switching variable such that a fraction, 0 1z≤ ≤ , of assets is allocated between h 
and l. 
Our model depends crucially on two key (vector) parameters. Employing the same notation albeit in two 
dimensions h and l, we consider the elasticity of attacking intensity denoted by the vector α . This is the para- 
meter that captures the marginal effectiveness of an additional attacker per target (η ) entering the ecosystem. 
In this case, we need to consider just two elasticities, lα  and hα  with corresponding lη  and hη , which 
are associated with low and high levels of difficulty in securing assets. Second, we consider parameters lψ  and 
hψ , which capture the relative rate of risk reduction for additional security investments by targets in each asset 
class ( lx  and hx ). 
Let { } [ ], : 0,1i l hσ +∈ →   be a function that determines the instantaneous time t risk for a fixed time-horizon,  
where ( ) { }0 0,t T t t t T= < < . When properly specified we can interpret σ  as the instantaneous probability of 
a successful attack. We refer to z as the “asset allocation” and the quantities lx  and lx  as the “investment 
allocation”, stated combinations of all three are referred as “allocation bundles”. 
Our assumption is that increased investment { },i l hx ∈  reduces the probability of a successful attack; that is, 
{ } { }, , 0i l h i l hxσ ∈ ∈∂ ∂ < , ceteris paribus. However, along with increasing investment there is a decreasing marginal 
reduction in the probability of a successful attack, { } { }
2 2
, , 0i l h i l hxσ ∈ ∈∂ ∂ > . Similarly, with increased attacking 
intensity { },i l hη ∈  on the particular area of allocation there should be a corresponding increase in the probability  
of a successful attack, { } { }, , 0i l h i l hσ η∈ ∈∂ ∂ > . 
A functional form for σ  that satisfies these conditions is the following multiplicative model: 
{ }e , , .i i ixi i i l hψ ασ η−= ∈                                    (1) 
Under this formulation, there is an upper bound on { },i l hη ∈  of 
1* e i i ixi
α ψη
−
< , for { },i l h∈ , such that iσ  may 
still be interpreted as probability of a successful attack. Here { },i l hψ ∈  is the relative marginal decrease in 
{ }, ,i i l hσ ∈  for a unit increase in { },i l hx ∈  whilst { },i l hα ∈  is the elasticity of attack. 
Let the number of attackers for each asset area be { }, ,A i l hN ∈ . The ratio of attackers per target is the attacking 
intensity { } { }, , , Ti l h A i l hN Nη ∈ ∈= . Let the reward 0R >  for a successful attack be proportional to the assets 
allocated in each area, h and l, and for notational simplicity let i l zζ = =  and = 1i h zζ = − . Set c c R=  to be 
the cost ratio of attack, where c is the unit cost of a single attack. When the attacker’s time preference is des- 
cribed by γ , the profit function for a single attacker is 
( ) { }
0
1
, e , d , , .
T
t
A i i i i i i
t
x t c i l hγ ζ η σ η− −Π = − ∈∫                          (2) 
We assume that attackers do not coordinate attacks (or are commissioned by a single attacker) and rewards are 
claimed on a first-winner-takes-all basis. Attackers are assumed to be drawn from a pool and make one-off entry 
decisions until marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal and hence , 0A iΠ = . 
For the targets of such attacks, let 0L >  be an instantaneous value of assets at risk from attack and β ∈  
be a subjective discount rate determining the time preferences of all targets. The risk neutral expected loss over 
the time horizon 0t t T< < , is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
e , 1 , d .
T
t
L l l l h h h l h
t
V z x L z x L t x xβ σ η σ η−= + − + +∫                     (3) 
The optimal allocation bundle ( ), ,l hz x x◊ ◊ ◊ , when attacking intensity is exogenous, is the simultaneous solu-  
tion of { }0, 0, 0L l L h LV x V x V z∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ =   . By construction, if { }, 0i l hα ∈ > , { }, 0i l hψ ∈ > , 0L > , 0β >   
and ( )0,1z∈ , a minimum of this function exists. By assumption we set that the optimal allocation must be  
either { }( ),i k hx +∈ ∈  when { }( ),i k hη +∈ ∈  or, if the minimum lies at { }, 0i l hx ∈ < , then { }, 0i l hx◊∈ = . Similarly,  
we impose the inequality constraint that 0 1z◊≤ ≤ . 
In the case of resilience, the time horizon, T, is of greater significance compared to the previous case and 
maybe determined endogenously. Let λ  be an arbitrarily large, but not infinite, number. For a given discount 
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rate, ( )min ,θ δ β= , by construction: 
0
1lim e d 1.
T t
T t
tθθ − −→∞ =∫   
Therefore, the approximation of the time horizon T  covering the 1 1 λ−  proportion of the future losses is 
derived from ( )logT λ θ=  . In this paper, we follow [17] and assume that β γ>  and ( )logT λ δ= , such 
that the interval t0 to T  covers 90% of the expected present value; that is, 10λ = . 
What is important, to the steward, is the overall mass of attacks against systems containing assets under the 
types l and h “storage/operations” areas and this will be influenced by the aggregate behaviour of targets and 
attackers, rather than the microstructure of individual attack-defence interactions. The more attractive the eco- 
system is to attackers, the greater the mass of attacks against its individual components. 
Proposition 3. (Existence of Nash equilibria without the steward) 
1) (Equilibrium Target Investment) Under the preceding assumptions, when e i i ixi i
ψ ασ η−= , for { },i l h∈ , the 
Nash equilibrium allocations of hx , lx  and z denoted 
*
hx , 
*
lx  and *z  are 
( )
( )
{ } { }
22
*
2
e 1
log , , , , ,
T
i ji i
i
i ij i
L T
x i l h j l h j i
c
δψ ψα α δ
ψ ψδβ ψ ψ
 − = − ∈ ∈ ≠  + 

 
* .l
h l
z
ψ
ψ ψ
=
+
                                    (4) 
2) (Equilibrium Attacker Intensity) Following from Part 1, above, the Nash equilibrium attacker intensities, 
denoted *lη  and 
*
hη  are 
( )
( ) { } { }
*
1
1
*
e 1 e
, , , , , ,
li ix TT
j
i
i j
i l h j l h j i
c
αψ δδψ
η
δ ψ ψ
−− − −
 = ∈ ∈ ≠
 +
 

                  (5) 
where { }
*
, ,i l hx ∈ , is the functional forms of the Nash equilibrium given in Part 1 (above). 
We demonstrate that, in this modelling approach, we do not have to impose an arbitrary constraint on l hx x+ , 
to create conditions similar to the standard results obtained when optimizing under such budget restrictions. 
3.1. Introducing the Steward 
The aim of the steward here is to ensure resilience, as defined above: the information system may not, given the 
choices of investment in information security allocated to the individual components, be resilient to debilitating 
shocks. 
The first stewardship action that we evaluate replicates our previous work (on sustainability [17]) by postulat- 
ing a Stackelberg policy framework in which the policy-maker stewarding the system sets rules relative to a 
target level of sustainability. When the steward is fully informed, our model reverts to the mechanism design 
problem discussed in [17], in which the steward is able to set a mandatory investment bundle (denoted by the 
lower bar) on the individual targets ( ),l hx x , as well as imposing a specific asset allocation z . 
The Nash equilibrium allocation for the TN  targets assumes no social coordination. Therefore, the Nash 
equilibrium allocation ( )* * *, ,l hx x z  of defensive effort and corresponding attacking intensities, ( )* *,l hη η , will 
not necessarily be the best solution for Pareto efficiency. Let ( )† † †, ,l hx x z  be the Pareto efficient allocations for 
a given set of model parameters { } { }( ), ,, , , , , , ,i l h i l hc Lα β δ λ ψ∈ ∈ . 
A classical efficiency model, with the steward acting as a public policy-maker and imposing ( ), ,l hx x z  [17], 
demonstrates that Pareto efficiency is guaranteed only when the subjective discount rate of the steward is equal 
to β  (the common discount rate). 
Indeed, the analysis of sustainability [1] [2] illustrates that, from the subjective viewpoint described by targets’ 
heterogeneous discount rates, the chosen values of ( ), ,l hx x z  cannot always be a Pareto efficient allocation, 
( )† † †, ,l hx x z , when β β≠ . However, there may exist constellations of parameters such the welfare of the 
individual agents have improved due to the presence of the steward despite their different discount rates. 
Let the steward’s discount rate be β . A fully informed steward sets a mandatory level of ( ), ,l hx x z  by 
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minimizing the following loss function 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
e , 1 , d ,
T
t
P l l l h h h l h
t
V z x L z x L t x xβ σ η σ η− ♦ ♦= + − + +∫                   (6) 
where ( ),i ix zη♦  for { },i l h∈  is the solution to 
( ) { }
0
1e , d , , ,
T
t
i i i i i
t
x t i l hδ ζ η σ η γ− − = ∈∫                             (7) 
in terms of ( ), ,l hx x z . As in the previous case by internalizing the attacker reaction curve, the fully informed 
policy-maker with identical time preferences to the homogenous targets β β=  will set an allocation bundle 
( ), ,l hx x z . 
Proposition 4. (The fully informed steward) 
1) (Target investment with steward) When e i i ixi i
ψ ασ η−=  and ( )h h lz ψ ψ ψ= + , the stewards optimal 
investment allocation ( ),l hx x  is 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
{ } { }
1
11 1log log e 1
11 1
log
e 1
, , , , .
j Tii j i j
i i
ji ii
T
i i i i
x
T T
L
i l h j l h j i
δα
β
α
ψ ψ ψ δ
ψ ψ γ
β αβ α αδ α
ψ ψ ψ ψ
−
   
= + + −       
 − − − −  + − +     −   
∈ ∈ ≠
                 (8) 
2) (Attacking intensity) Following from Part 1, above, the attacker intensity { },i l hη ∈  is 
( )
( ) { } { }
1
1e 1 e
, , , , ,
i i ix TT
i
i
j i
i l h j l h j i
ψ δδ αψ
η
γδ ψ ψ
− − − −
 = ∈ ∈ ≠
 + 
                  (9) 
where ix  is given in Equation (8). 
Proposition 5. (The steward’s improvement) If e i i ixi i
ψ ασ η−= , with β β≥ , and { } { }, ,0, 0,i l h i l hα ψ∈ ∈> >  
0, 0, 0Lγ δ> > >  and the asset allocation is constrained to ( )h h lz ψ ψ ψ= + , then the steward’s mandated 
investment { },i l hx ∈  is always greater than or equal to the Nash equilibrium investment bundle { }
*
,i l hx ∈ . 
A useful by-product of the comparison between Propositions 1 and 2 is that we can define an upper bound on 
β β≥  such that the steward does at least as well as the Nash equilibrium even when the steward weights 
potential near-term losses more than the targets do. Again, this is covered in more detail for the one-dimensional 
case in [17]. 
We now progress to the case of a partially informed steward with a minority action: Let the steward observe 
and enforce only hx . The steward can observe and internalize the externality in hη , but cannot observe or 
enforce z  or lx . The targets then choose the investment and allocation bundle ( ),lx z  following: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
,
, ; , , e , 1 , dargmin
l
T
t
l h l h l l l h h h l h
x z t
x z x z x L z x L t x xβη η σ η σ η−= + − + +∫                (10) 
and the steward now solves the following minority optimization, with the steward’s given information set: 
( ) ( )( )
0
ˆe , d ,argmin
h
T
t
h h h h h h
x t
x L x t xβη σ η− ♦= +∫                           (11) 
where hη
♦  is the solution to the attacker entry problem from Equation (2), but only for the h asset class. 
From the steward’s point of view, this is now 
( )
0
1e , d .
T
t
h h h h h
t
x t cδ ζ η σ η− − =∫                                      (12) 
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Note that the steward now takes for given L as the value of losses. This is because the steward can no longer 
identify zL  and ( )1 z L− ; the steward is simply given Lˆ  by the targets a priori, and this is assumed to be 
exogenous. Similarly, whilst hζ  is equal to z from the viewpoint of attackers and targets, it is simply a 
parameter unrelated to the overall asset allocation of the targets from the point of view of the steward. The 
steward is now, unwittingly, not a Stackelberg policy-maker, but in a Nash equilibrium with the targets and 
attackers. 
Proposition 6. (Attackers and the steward) 
1) (Asset Class h investment guided by the steward) If e i i ixi i
ψ ασ η−= , for { },i l h∈ , the steward’s objective 
function is as stated in Equation (11), and the attacker dynamics are as given in Equation (12), then the 
steward’s optimal mandated investment allocation is 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 ˆlog e 1 log e
1 log 1 .
bT Th h
h h
h h
h h h
h
x L
T T
δα αψ γδ ζ ζ
ψ ψ
βα β α α β δ β
ψ
−
= − − −
+ − − + − −
 
                  (13) 
Following from the steward’s choice, the attacker intensity, given the steward’s actions hη , is given by 
( )
1
1e 1 e
,
h h hx TT
h
ψ δδ αζ
η
γδ
− − − −
 =
 
 

                             (14) 
where hx  is as defined in Equation (13). Investment in class l will be decided by the agents, conditional on the 
steward’s recommendation for h. 
2) (Asset Class l) We now consider the targets’ and attackers’ new equilibrium: if e i i ixi i
ψ ασ η−= , for { },i l h∈ , 
and the targets’ objective is as specified in Equation (10), then the equilibrium allocation bundle ,lx z  will be 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )
‡
‡
1 log
log log e 1 log e 1 )
e
,
e 1
h
h h
h h h
l h
l
T Tl
h h l h h
l
x T
h
T
l
x
L T T x
z
L
α
α αδ β
α ψ β
β
η
ψ
α
η β η γδψ β δ ψ
ψ
βη
ψ
−
− +
= −
+ + − − − + − +
=
−
     (16) 
and the attacker intensity lη  is given by 
( ) ‡
1
1
‡
e 1 e
= .
lllx TT
l
z αψ δδ
η
γδ
−− − − 
  
 
                            (17) 
Note that we use the ‡  to denote this new equilibrium for the targets as it is not strictly a Nash equilibrium 
solution, but rather is Bayes-Nash equilibrium, in which the steward has prior values for Lˆ  and ζ . See [18] 
for an explanation of the difference between Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria. 
3.2. Measuring Resilience 
Measuring the impact of technological shocks to { }, ,i i l hα ∈  and { }, ,i i l hψ ∈  and economic shocks to β , β , δ , 
L , and c  is a challenging task which requires the creation of an arbitrary metric. Here, we combine the 
equilibrium values of { },i l hx ∈ , z, and { },i l hη ∈  using a total non-discounted loss function for the risk component 
only. This is given as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
, , 1 , d
T
A l l l h h h
t
V v u z x L z x L tσ η σ η= + −∫


                            (18) 
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{ } { }( ), ,, ,i l h i l hv z x η∈ ∈=                                    (19) 
{ } { }( ), , , ,, ,i i l h i i l hu α ψ∈ ∈=                                 (20) 
where ( )logT λ θ= −  and ( )min , ,θ β β δ= , for an arbitrary λ  tending to zero. By construction, Equation 
18 gives an undiscounted loss function, so that the value of the critical parameter T , which represents the 
step-size of the periods considered in the model (cf. Figure 3, for a multi-period sustainability model), is finite. 
v  is the collection of choice variables under the various stewardship options and u  is the collection of para- 
meters that are subject to the technology shocks under consideration. 
For a single period, resilience will be measured by a response function to shocks to the parameters u . Our 
choice of the response function for technology shocks allows for shocks across the set of parameters, u , either 
simultaneously or individually. It is given by the numerical evaluation of the following ordinary differential 
equation: 
( ) ( )
0
1
, , d ,
T
l l
l h
t
zxz xI u L L t
u u u u u u
η η
σ σ
∂ −∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂   = +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
∫


 

  
     
             (21) 
{ } { }{ }, ,, ,i l h i l hu α ψ∈ ∈=  
where each case has a set of functional forms for z , { },i l hx ∈  and { },i l hη ∈ . We have denoted the three cases as 
follows: *v v=  and *u u=  for the Nash equilibrium, v v=  and u u=  for the fully informed steward and 
‡v v=  and ‡u u=  for the partially informed steward with minority action case. 
We are interested in establishing the thresholds, illustrated in Figure 6, which describe levels of system 
operating capacity, as measured by loss, for differing degrees of the steward’s effectiveness. We attempt to 
establish whether the system restores, through co-ordinated investment, to the target zone or not. 
In our model, these thresholds reveal themselves as discontinuities, relative to shock size, in the solutions to 
Equation (21), below. Such discontinuities can be seen in our simulations as the asymptotes in Figure 7 and 
Figure 8, for fully and partially informed stewards. 
 
 
Figure 6. Resilience with an incompletely informed steward.                                                   
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Figure 7. The steward’s total non-discounted loss function, AV , as a function of lα . An important point to note is that 
this does not include the deterministic up-front investment, so this curve can actually slope downwards, even with 
increasing lα . The upper curve represents 0.01l hψ ψ ψ= = = , the middle curve 0.1ψ =  and the lower curve is 
0.5ψ = . These values of ψ  represent, respectively, low, medium, and high rates of risk reduction for additional 
investment.                                                                                                   
 
Let ( )* *,AV v u  and ( )*I u  be, respectively, the total non-discounted loss for the risk component under the 
Nash equilibrium and the corresponding collection of response functions. Similarly let ( ) ( ), ,AV v u I u   and 
( ) ( )‡ ‡ ‡, ,AV v u I u   be, respectively, the same pair of functions and collection of functions for the fully informed 
steward and the partially informed steward with minority action cases. 
We can measure the effectiveness of the steward by comparing ( )* *,AV v u  to ( ),AV v u . We can also eva- 
luate the erosion in risk reduction caused by restricting the stewards information set and action space by pair- 
wise evaluation of ( )* *,AV v u  and ( ),AV v u  with ( )‡ ‡,AV v u . 
To examine the impact of shocks and measure resilience we compare the response functions ( )*I u  and 
( )I u  to evaluate the impact of the fully informed steward. Finally, we can compare the resilience of the sys- 
tem when the stewards information set is restricted by comparing ( )*I u  and ( )I u  to ( )‡I u , for varying 
sizes of shocks in u . In particular, we focus on { },i l hα ∈ . 
3.3. An Example Simulation 
This simulation is designed to provide an overview of the intuition of our model and is not supposed to provide 
specific quantification for our proposed application. However, we have tried to stay close to real data when 
possible. 
Let us assume that targets have a discount rate of 20% per annum ( ( )log 6 5β =  continuous growth rate), in 
this case when 10λ = , the target time overall horizon is 12.3T =  years. This appears to be a reasonable 
assumption for the amortization of information assets within a firm see, for example, the survey in [19]. For 
electricity transmission in the United States, the difference between physical and information assets can be 
found in [20] [21]. 
We assume that the societal discount rate used by the steward is much lower and ranges from 0β →  to  
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Figure 8. Partially informed steward with minority action total non-discounted loss function AV  as a function of lα . 
In this case, the targets maintain assets in the increasingly risky l class to avoid costly regulation in h. However, a 
discontinuity exists at lα , causing the loss function to spike before the assets are shifted back to the regulated domain.   
 
1 10β → . In [17], we outline the various debates on the appropriate social discount factor to be applied in 
public policy scenarios. For certain areas of public policy debate such as climate change discount rates 
approaching zero a common for certain economic arguments relating to low carbon policies. For information 
stewardship the requirement is not so acute but significant differences between firm discount rates and societal 
discount rates remain. 
For our starting numerical example, we assume that l hψ ψ= ; that is, the relative marginal risk reduction 
from investment in both asset classes is identical and fixed. We assume that it is 1/100, 1/10 and 1/2, to 
represent low, medium and high effectiveness bands, respectively. This is a more difficult assumption to justify 
as there is very little literature on the efficacy of investment in security in this area; therefore, our simulation 
covers a wide range of reasonable bands. 
We arbitrarily fix the instantaneous total loss to $1M, as an example, and divide all losses by L  to give a 
per-dollar-at-risk measure. Starting from the Nash equilibrium assumption, we presume that the rate of reduction 
in risk for a given investment is the same for both asset classes, it follows that the chosen weighting in each 
class with be 1/2 from the optimal weighting requirment. 
We set the attackers’ discount rate to be ( )log 11 10 , or a 10% discrete rate of return. From the viewpoint of 
attackers, the discount rate is analogous to an investment, as opposed to depreciation and amortization from the 
viewpoint of the targets. The most difficult parameter to set in the simulation is the cost per attack to reward 
ratio as almost no data exists on this quantity. When the cost to reward approaches zero, the cost per attack 
divided by reward indicates that either the rewards are very high or that the cost per attack is very low and 
intensity tends to infinity. This asymptotic trend in attacking has not been observed, therefore we stick to a ratio 
of about 10%. The shock of interest is that to the elasticity of attack { },i l hα ∈  and, in particular, shocks to lα , 
hence attackers gain a new capability that allows them to be far more effective than before. This is the most 
realistic scenario—as opposed to significant shocks to the economy of attack or the capability of defence. 
For the partially informed steward with minority action, the total non-discounted loss In this case, the pattern 
is similar to the Nash equilibrium for small shocks. The targets, however have costly regulation in the h asset 
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class and are under investing in the l asset class. Unfortunately, in this case there is a discontinuity at 1lα = , so 
the total loss spikes prior to the shift in assets from l to h. This is a de facto boundary, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
We can see that before the steward can regulate the assets, the total risk will traverse the discontinuity, before 
the steward can actually manage the majority of assets that the targets have not declared. Here, we can see a case 
of an ecosystem that is not resilient and lies within the feasible boundaries of our example parameter sets. 
4. Conclusions 
An information security ecosystem consists in a finite set of interacting agents supported by a specific in- 
frastructure, which may have logical, physical, and economic components, supporting people, process, and tech- 
nology. 
The security posture of an ecosystem is a function of the postures of the participating agents and specified 
properties of the infrastructure that supports the ecosystem. The ecosystem exists and operates in an environ- 
ment in which threats to the system’s confidentiality, integrity and availability are initiated by a variety of 
sources. Such threats are taken as giving rise to shocks deteriorating ecosystem’s operational posture. That is, its 
sustainability—the tendency of a firm or of the ecosystem to remain within acceptable operating bounds—and 
resilience—the tendency of an agent or of the ecosystem to restore, in a timely manner, its operating capacity to 
within acceptable operating range having been subject to a shock that has placed its operating capacity outwith 
it. 
In this paper, we have addressed the question of whether it is socially desirable to introduce an institution with 
the authority to mandate resources for investment in information security in order to maintain (or preserve) the 
system’s sustainability and resilience, rather than protecting these characteristics at the individual agents’ levels. 
This institution, the information steward is therefore entrusted and empowered with the authority to maintain the 
sustainability and resilience of the security posture of the ecosystem. The steward’s preferences are understood 
to derive in some form from the collective preferences of the participating agents, in their desire to maintain the 
system’s operational stability. 
The threats to the system’s stability emanate from rational agents, the attackers, who, in deploying their re-
sources, are fully informed of their potential gains given their technologies and, more importantly, the system’s 
average protective posture. Agents operating in the system also invest in information security measures that take 
into account the costs of such investment and the possible losses following a successful attack. Both the defend-
ing agents and attackers engage in a situation of strategic interaction, and it is in this context that the relevant 
resources are deployed. 
The introduction of the information steward, with authority to mandate to all agents in the system investment 
in information security, whilst fully informed on both the attacking and defending technologies, alters the deci-
sion landscape. In terms of maintaining and preserving the system’s sustainability in the presence of secular de-
terioration, we show that the presence of the steward will act as a deterrent to attackers who will now know that 
the system’s average defensive expenditure is higher thus reducing their expected gains from a successful attack 
by reducing markedly the probability of such event. In this case, the intensity of attacks declines and the sys-
tem’s secular decline is interrupted as its capacity shifts to higher level. The steward is shown to be effective in 
this respect. However, whether such intervention is strictly welfare-improving for all individual agents in the 
system is debatable, given the possibly large range of discount factors used by the agents in computing their 
“equilibrium” investment in information security. It is not uncommon to postulate that such a collective body 
will, in deciding the optimal investment in information security, use higher discount factors than the individual 
agents as its brief is the system’s sustainability over some longer horizon, which may not coincide with the ho-
rizon of the agents, who aim at achieving short-run performance measures. 
In terms of improving the system’s ability to recover quickly after a negative temporary shock to its opera-
tional capacity—that is, of resilience—the influence of the presence of the information steward requires the ap-
propriate design of the steward’s mandate. There now two sets of strategic interactions: the usual one between 
the attackers and defenders, but, in addition, agents now have incentives to avoid additional information security 
investment—that which may be demanded by the steward—by deliberately mis-classifying the status of infor-
mation assets which are under threat of attack. In such incomplete design, when the steward’s ability to be fully 
informed is impaired and fails to enjoy the complete set of instruments at its disposal, the public co-ordination of 
investment in information security is actually welfare-reducing compared to the un-coordinated outcome for the 
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system as a whole. 
In conclusion, public co-ordination of investment in information security in order to maintain the system’s 
capacity in terms of sustainability and resilience can, by increasing the system’s defensive posture, be effective 
in deterring attacks. It is important that a great deal of attention is required in designing such a co-ordinating in- 
stitution, which will enjoy rather wide powers to decree the allocation of resources to information security. We 
have addressed the issue of the desirability of public co-ordination of investment in information security by 
bringing together a body of work on the common thread of the information steward. Integrating in a coherent 
manner these diverse results provides for a lucid understanding of the institutional requirements for the design 
and function of such a public institution and, depending upon the nature of the threat facing the information 
ecosystem, helps clarify the policy responses. 
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